US COIN Campaigns in Philippines and Vietnam Research Paper

US COIN Campaigns in Philippines and Vietnam - Research Paper Example Finally, this paper will strive to highlight the lessons that US learnt from its past COIN campaigns in the form of two consecutive successes; one achieved in Iraq and the other in Afghanistan. Introduction Counterinsurgencies (COIN) are described as a common war tactic. Foe groups engaged in wars often use this particular tactic to identify and overcome insurgencies prior to their occurrence. The authoritative governmental military groups since time immemorial have organized COIN campaigns. However, its rudimental intention remains the same. COIN campaigns were majorly covered in H100 when the US Army used many tactics and strategies in Vietnam and the Philippines. Governmental forces took a considerable amount of time to frame winning strategies in the COIN campaigns in both cases. The focus on these COIN campaigns was to make devastating offensive operations to defeat the insurgency disclosed, develop cultural understandings with the foes and to apply competent intelligence in mit igating chances for future insurgency attacks. Nonetheless, the results obtained in both the COIN campaigns proved drastically different. Even though the COIN campaign against Filipino insurgencies was a success, the US Army failed to defeat Vietnamese insurgencies in H100 (Gentile, 2009). Certainly, there are certain aspects essential for framing COIN strategies and thus ensuring their overall success. For instance, a COIN strategy must include an in-depth understanding of the motives and the objectives of insurgencies along with cultural and religious aspects of both insurgents and local populace in a differentiated manner. It is vital that the COIN strategy complies with the legal aspects of performing a counterinsurgency. Correspondingly, governmental policies to...However, its rudimental intention remains the same. COIN campaigns were majorly covered in H100 when the US Army used many tactics and strategies in Vietnam and the Philippines. Governmental forces took a considerable amount of time to frame winning strategies in the COIN campaigns in both cases. The focus on these COIN campaigns was to make devastating offensive operations to defeat the insurgency disclosed, develop cultural understandings with the foes and to apply competent intelligence in mitigating chances for future insurgency attacks. Nonetheless, the results obtained in both the COIN campaigns proved drastically different. Even though the COIN campaign against Filipino insurgencies was a success, the US Army failed to defeat Vietnamese insurgencies in H100 (Gentile, 2009). Certainly, there are certain aspects essential for framing COIN strategies and thus ensuring their overall success. For instance, a COIN strategy must include an in-depth understanding of the motives and the objectives of insurgencies along with cultural and religious aspects of both insurgents and local populace in a differentiated manner. It is vital that the COIN strategy complies with the legal aspects of performing a counterinsurgency. Correspondingly, governmental policies to combat insurgencies with effective COIN campaigns also play an essential role (Corum, 2007).